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Abstract: This paper aims at analyzing two different dispute settlement procedures (DSPs), - 
multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)‘s DSPs and World Trade Organization (WTO)‘s 
Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP)- in the context of their role in managing environmental 
questions. For this purpose, it starts with drawing a general framework on DSPs created under 
different MEAs. Afterwards, it examines the WTO‘s DSP with a careful and detailed analysis of 
WTO cases on environmental issues. Thirdly, it focuses on the relationship between the MEAs‘ DSPs 
and the WTO‘s DSP. After this clarification on two systems with their main features, it makes a 
comparative analysis between them, discussing weaknesses and gaps of both systems in the 
settlement of environmental disputes. As a conclusion, based on its findings, its provides a general 
evolution on its analysis. 
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1. Introduction 
Principle 26 of the 1992 Rio Declaration clearly sets out that states have to ―resolve 
all their environmental disputes peacefully and by appropriate means in accordance 
with the Charter of the United Nations.‖ 
Art. 33(1) of the UN Charter, on the other hand, states that the settlement of 
disputes can be provided ―by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means of their own choice.‖ Thus, it put forwards two kinds of means 
(procedures) for dispute settlement: 1. diplomatic means, such as negotiation, 
inquiry, mediation, conciliation,
 and 2. ―judicial‖ (Ehrmann, 2002) (or ―legal‖ 
(Sands, 1996) or ―adjudicative‖) (Romano, 2000) means, such as arbitration and 
judicial settlement. 
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The aim of this work is to analyze two different dispute settlement procedures 
(DSPs), multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs)‘s DSPs and World Trade 
Organization (WTO)‘s Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP), in the context of their 
role in managing environmental questions, to make a comparative analysis between 
them and to discuss the weaknesses involved in both systems in the settlement of 
environmental disputes.  
On this basis, it starts with drawing a general framework on DSPs created under 
different MEAs. Afterwards, it examines the WTO‘s DSP with a careful and 
detailed analysis on WTO cases on environmental issues. Thirdly, it focuses on the 
relationship between the MEAs‘ DSPs and the WTO‘s DSP. After this clarification 
on two systems with their main features, it makes a comparative analysis between 
them, discussing weaknesses and gaps of both systems in the settlement of 
environmental disputes. As a conclusion, based on its findings, its provides a 
general evolution on its analysis. 
 
2 Dispute Settlement Procedures (DSPs) under Multilateral 
Environmental Agreements (MEAs) 
Before proceeding further and focusing on the significant aspects of DSPs under 
MEAs, first of all, it should be underlined that, all MEAs do not contain ―the 
complete model‖ (Treves, 2009, pp. 499-501) of dispute settlement including both 
judicial and diplomatic procedures.  
There can be three distinct group agreements according to their inclusion these 
procedures: First group consists of all procedures completely, e.g. the Vienna 
Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer, art. 11 (applicable also to the 
Montreal Protocol etc.) the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate 
Change (UNFCCC), art.14 (applicable also to the Kyoto Protocol) etc. Second 
group adopts the negotiation and submission of the dispute to the arbitration and 
judicial settlement, e.g. the UNECE Convention on Access to Information, Public 
Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters, 
usually known as the Aarhus Convention, art. 16, the Basel Convention on the 
Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 
usually known as the Basel Convention, art. 20, etc.). Third group involves merely 
negotiation, e.g. the Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, 
often abbreviated as Air Pollution or CLRTAP, art. 13 and its four protocols, the 
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European Pollutant Emission Register (EPER) Protocol, art.7, the first Sulphur 
Protocol, art.8, the Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Nitrogen 
Oxides or their Transboundary Fluxes (NOx Protocol), art. 13, the 
Protocol concerning the Control of Emissions of Volatile Organic Compounds or 
their Transboundary Fluxes (VOC Protocol), art. 12) (Treves, 2009, pp. 499-501).  
Also, the provisions included to the MEAs for settling disputes can differ 
according to the features of different MEAs, so, it becomes necessary to examine 
every MEA with its own conditions. However, as the aim of this paper is to draw a 
general framework on the MEAs‘ DSPs, but not exhaustively deal with the various 
aspects of each of these procedures inserted into different MEAs, each procedure 
under ―the complete model‖ (Treves, 2009, pp. 499-501) of dispute settlement will 
be briefly explained with its significant aspects in this part. 
 
2.1. Diplomatic Means 
2.1.1. Negotiation 
Negotiation is an informal and flexible procedure which provides direct contact of 
the parties of the dispute and exchange of their views. On the basis of the principle 
of good faith, the parties negotiate and endeavor to find a jointly agreed solution. 
So, parties have direct control over the dispute regarding the interpretation or 
application of an agreement, the resolution process and its non-binding outcome. 
Its ―flexibility‖ and ―informality‖ can render some benefits for leading to the 
resolution in an easy way (Kolari, 2002). On the other hand, in this procedure, 
there is no third party which helps the parties to solve the dispute. In addition, 
when one side of the acts against the negotiated outcome, there is no way of 
enforcing this side to act to the agreed outcome. 
2.1.2. Mediation  
Some environmental agreements can also involve mediation mechanism (or good 
offices of a third party) when the negotiation fails to settle the dispute (e.g. art. 
11(2), the Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Biodiversity 
Convention). In some MEAs, mediation can also be used as one of the first 
remedies (e.g. art. XXV of the Antarctic Convention on Marine Living Resources) 
or an alternative mechanism (e.g. the Rotterdam and Stockholm Conventions). 
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In this mechanism, a third person (another party to the agreement, the Secretariat or 
a specific Committee of the agreement) also participates to ―the interchange of 
proposals‖ between the parties to the dispute, and he can submit his informal 
proposals to the parties to resolve the dispute (Sands & MacKenzie, 2000).  
2.1.3. Conciliation 
Conciliation can be defined in-between among the other formal and informal 
procedures, as it is more formal than mediation, but not as formal as judicial 
procedures. In this mechanism, as in mediation, there is a third-party who is 
entitled to resolve the dispute between two parties. Yet, here, he has the right to 
investigate and consider the factual and legal aspects of the dispute and to make 
formal proposals for the amicable settlement of the dispute (Aust, 2000, p. 289; 
Kolari, 2002; Sands & MacKenzie, 2000). 
The outcome does not again bind the parties of the dispute, it is recommendatory in 
nature. However, it is argued that, even if it is recommendatory, in practice, it can 
pressure the parties through the impact of the public, if the decision is declared 
publicly (Chayes; Chayes & Mitchell, 1998, p. 55; Kolari, 2002).  
In some agreements, it can also be referred to a Conciliation Commission, e.g. 
Vienna Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer, art. 11(5), which can be 
created by the request of one of the parties to the dispute. This Commission is 
generally composed of an equal number of members appointed by each party and 
aims to resolve the dispute with a recommendatory decision-unless otherwise 
agreed-. Because the Commission has power ―to elucidate the facts, may hear the 
parties, and must make proposals for a settlement‖ (Brownlie, 2003, pp. 672-673), 
it can be argued that it has ―a semi-judicial aspect.‖ In addition, ―[t]he prospect of 
being brought‖ before this kind of Commission can be found as facilitative to settle 
the dispute creating pressure on parties (Treves, 2009, p. 503). 
Conciliation can be either optional or compulsory: 
Optional Conciliation: The parties can agree to submit the dispute to conciliation 
which is counted as one of the DSPs among others in the agreement. 
Compulsory Conciliation: If a dispute has not been settled by negotiation or other 
means and if the parties have not accepted the same or any compulsory procedure 
available under the agreement in a reasonable time, then either party can take the 
dispute to conciliation in accordance with the procedure accepted under specific 
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annexes adopted by the agreement or Conference of the Parties (COP) (e.g. art. 
11(5), Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, art. 27(4), 
Convention on Biological Diversity). Thus, as different from other DSPs 
mentioned above which require ―parallel declarations‖ of the parties, conciliation 
can be resorted one of the parties‘ request and the others‘ acceptance this request 
(Treves, 2009, p. 516). Through submission of one party, all parties become 
involved into the procedure, yet, the decision at the end of the procedure continues 
to be non-binding for all parties. 
 
2.2. Judicial Means 
Where a dispute has not been settled by other procedures, it then should be 
submitted to arbitration ‖the submission of a dispute to a judge or judges in 
principle chosen by the parties who agree to accept and respect the judgment‖ 
(Aust, 2000, p. 291) or judicial settlement at the request of any one party.  
Thus, MEAs can also include the possibility of resorting to judicial settlement 
and/or to arbitration relying on ad hoc arrangements like the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration (PCA), set up under the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes of 1989, or standing bodies like the International Tribunal 
for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS), International Court of Justice (ICJ) for dispute 
settlement. While some MEAs require the submission of parties a declaration 
accepting compulsory dispute settlement of the ICJ and/or arbitration, others can 
require the agreement of the parties on arbitration or submission to the ICJ. In fact, 
in relation to a particular dispute, the ICJ‘s jurisdiction can arise in contentious 
cases between two or more states by a special agreement (―compromis‖ (Sands, 
1996) whereby two or more states agree to refer a particular dispute to the ICJ (art. 
36(1) of the ICJ Statute), or by a ―compromissory clause‖ (Sands, 1996) in an 
international agreement. Or under ―the optional clause‖ (Dagne, 2007; Sands, 
1996), whereby parties to the statute may make a unilateral declaration recognizing 
its compulsory jurisdiction without special agreement (art. 36 (2) of the Statute). 
To illustrate, the agreement over the conservation and management of southern 
Bluefin tuna stocks adopted between Japan, Australia and New Zealand 
(Convention for the Conservation of the Southern Bluefin Tuna, art. 16), involves a 
dispute settlement clause stating that in case of dispute, ―…with the consent in each 
of all parties to the dispute, [it will] be referred for settlement to the International 
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Court of Justice or to arbitration.‖ Using this clause, the Southern Bluefin Tuna 
case
1
 was resorted to the ICJ by Japan against Australia and New Zealand. 
The United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS)
 
should be 
noteworthy here, as it has compulsory, binding arbitration, art. 287(5), UNCLOS. 
In Part XV, the Convention establishes its dispute settlement system. In its first 
section (arts. 279-285, UNCLOS), it encourages parties to settle their disputes 
choosing the peaceful means they wish to resolve disputes including conciliation 
(specifically referred, art.284) and negotiation (not specifically referred). When 
they fail to resolve disputes by the means that they chose freely, the dispute can be 
submitted to the compulsory procedures entailing final and binding decisions 
[art.296,(1)]under second section of Part XV (arts. 286-296).
2
 The Convention 
allows the parties to choose one or more of these different dispute settlement 
methods [art.287, (1)]:  
a) the ITLOS 
b) the International Court of Justice 
This is a compromissory clause in respect of art. 36 (1) of the ICJ Statute. Yet, it is 
also possbile to apply to the ICJ by special agreement and under the optional clause 
declaration (art. 36(2) of the ICJ Statute) (Schiffman, 1998).  
c) an arbitral tribunal, Annex VII. 
d) a special arbitral tribunal, Annex VIII.  
If the parties choose the same method, then it has become operative over the 
dispute upon the unilateral application of either party. If they do not choose 
the same one, or none, then arbitration ipso facto becomes the dispute 
settlement mechanism of the dispute at issue [compulsory arbitration, art. 
287(5)]. 
Third section of Part XV (arts. 297-299) states the limitations and exceptions to the 
binding procedures of second section. This ―categorization and separation‖ in 
between different disputes providing some of them binding compulsory settlement, 
but others not, is criticized due to the fact that it can seriously undermine the Part 
XV regime (Rayfuse, 2005). In addition, particularly in the field of environmental 
                                                     
1 See the case details from http://www.itlos.org/index.php?id=62. 
2 See third section of Part XV for the limitations and exceptions to the binding procedures of second 
section.  
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protection, it is observed that not much action thus far has occurred under Part XV 
(Schiffman, 1998). 
 
3 Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) under World Trade 
Organization (WTO): What makes it more effective, if really effective? 
A WTO dispute proceeding mainly consists of four phases: consultations, the 
dispute panel (involving the panel proceedings (interim and final reports), adoption 
of panel reports, measures (compensation and suspension of concessions), the 
appellate process, and implementation and compliance of panel and appellate body 
reports. 
 
3.1. Consultations 
In the WTO system, dispute settlement procedure can only be initiated by a WTO 
member state when it considers that ―any benefits accruing to it directly or 
indirectly under the covered agreements are being impaired by measures taken by 
another Member‖ (art. 3.3, Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU), and 
request by the complainant party for consultations emerges as a precondition for 
further dispute settlement proceedings. 
As different from other dispute settlement procedures, here, there are tight 
deadlines and detailed provisions on the application process of the counseling 
process. To illustrate, there are precise time periods for replying to the consultation 
request (within 10 days after the date of its receipt), for entering into consultations 
(within a period of no more than 30 days after the date of receipt of the request) 
(art. 4.3, DSU). If these periods are expired without replying and entering into 
consultations, it is possible for the member that requested the holding of 
consultations to proceed directly to request for the establishment of a panel process 
(art. 4.3, DSU). In addition, there are provisions on what should be done in cases of 
urgency (art. 4.8.9, DSU), when a member other than the consulting members 
considers that it has a substantial trade interest in consultations (art. 4.11, DSU), on 
confidentiality of the process (art. 4.6, DSU) etc. 
In addition to consultations, the parties to a dispute also have the right to revoke to 
good offices, conciliation and mediation at any time (art. 5.3, DSU). There are 
again precise time periods, similar to provisions on consultations, for entering into 
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these procedures and for leading to consultations before requesting the 
establishment of a panel (art.5.4, DSU). 
 
3.2. The Panel Process  
Before requesting the establishment of a panel, the complainant party should allow 
60 days after the date of receipt of the request for consultations If all the parties to 
the dispute consider that the good offices, conciliation or mediation process has 
failed to settle the dispute, the complainant party can request the establishment of a 
panel during the 60-day period (art. 5.4, DSU). While the panel process proceeds, 
good offices, conciliation or mediation procedures can proceed in tandem, if all 
parties to the dispute agree on it (art. 5.5, DSU).  
Unless the DSB which is composed of all WTO members decides by consensus not 
to establish a panel (for the DSB‘s competences see art.2.1, DSU), a panel should 
be established at the latest at the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) meeting 
following the first appearance of the request as an item on the DSB's agenda (art. 
6.1, DSU),  
Regarding the composition of panels (art.8, DSU), panels are generally constituted 
by three governmental and/or non-governmental individuals (art. 8.5, DSU), who 
are suggested by the WTO Secretariat and agreed to by the Parties to the dispute. 
Panelists serve not as government representatives, nor as representatives of any 
organization. So, members should not give them instructions and not to seek to 
influence them (art. 8.9, DSU). Their selection is made from a list of names 
suggested by members and approved by DSB (art. 8.4, DSU). If the parties cannot 
agree on the panelists within 20 days after the date of the establishment of a panel, 
any party to the dispute can request the Director-General to determine the 
composition of the panel (art. 8.7, DSU). When a dispute arises between a 
developing country member and a developed country member, the developing 
country member can request the inclusion of at least one panelist to the panel from 
a developing country member (art. 8.10, DSU). 
Like consultations, panel procedures also aim not to delay ―unduly‖ the process 
(art. 12.2, DSU), so the panelists determine the timetable for the panel process (art. 
12.3.4.5, DSU). In addition, the period in which the panel conducts its 
examination, as a general rule, should not exceed six months. In only cases of 
urgency, the panel can issue its report to the parties to the dispute within three 
RELATIONES INTERNATIONALES 
 63 
months (art.12.8, DSU). Under circumstances in which the panel cannot issue its 
report within six months or within three months in cases of urgency, it informs the 
DSB on the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within 
which it will issue its report. However, in no case, the period cannot exceed nine 
months (art.12.9, DSU). 
If the parties to the dispute cannot develop a ―mutually satisfactory solution,‖ the 
panel submit its findings of the facts and recommendations, and the reasons behind 
them in the form of a written report to the DSB. However, if a solution is found, 
the report only includes a brief description of the case and states that a solution has 
been found (art. 12.7, DSU). There are here again specific provisions regarding 
developing country members as being in consultations (art. 12.10.11, DSU). 
Following written submissions and oral arguments from the parties, the panel also 
issues the descriptive part of its draft report to the parties (art. 15.1, DSU). With the 
expiration of the period for receiving the comments from the parties to the dispute, 
the panel can issue an interim report to the parties, including not only the 
descriptive part but also findings and conclusions. Within a period of time set by 
the panel, a party can request from the panel to review precise aspects of the 
interim report or to hold a further meeting with the parties on the issues identified 
in the written comments. If no comments are received from any party within the 
determined period, the interim report is considered the final panel report (art. 15.2, 
DSU). 
After the date the report is issued to the members, it is not adopted for 20 days by 
the DSB to enable the parties adequate period to consider on them (art. 16.1, 
DSU).If there are members who want to explain their objections on the report, they 
have to give their reasons in written at least 10 days prior to the DSB meeting 
which will consider the adoption of the panel report (art. 16.2, DSU).There is again 
a precise deadline on the adoption of the report, it should be adopted in 60 days 
after its issue to the members. Yet, if a party to the dispute declares its decision to 
appeal, then, until the end of the appeal process, the DSP does not consider for 
adoption of the report (art. 16.4, DSU). 
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3.3. The Appellate Process 
The standing Appellate Body consists of seven individuals who are unaffiliated 
with any government and have recognized authority in the field of law and 
international trade (art. 7.3, DSU).  
The Appellate Body can address the issues as ―limited to issues of law covered in 
the panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel,‖ (art. 12.6.7, 
DSU) and can ―uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the 
panel‖ based on its examination (art. 12.13, DSU). 
There is here again time limitation for the proceedings. They cannot exceed 60 
days from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal to 
the date the Appellate Body issues its report. If the Appellate Body cannot provide 
its report within 60 days, it should inform the DSB the reasons for the delay 
together with an estimate of the additional period required for submitting its report. 
Yet, under no circumstances, they can exceed 90 days (art. 12.5, DSU). Another 
time limitation is about the period from the date of establishment of the panel by 
the DSB until the date the DSB considers the panel or appellate report for adoption. 
It cannot exceed nine months where the panel report is not appealed or 12 months 
where the report is appealed (art. 20, DSU). 
 
3.4. Implementation and Compliance (art. 21, art. 22, DSU) 
If a panel or the Appellate Body finds out that a measure subject to dispute 
settlement is inconsistent with a covered agreement, it is expected from the 
member in question to bring the measure into conformity with that agreement 
immediately following the recommendations of the adopted report by the DSB.  
Within 30 days after the adoption of the panel or Appellate Body report, the 
member concerned should inform the DSB of its intentions in respect of 
implementation of the recommendations and rulings of the DSB. Yet, if to comply 
immediately with the recommendations and rulings is impracticable for it, it can be 
given a reasonable period of time for doing so (art. 21.3, DSU). As a general rule, 
this period should not exceed 15 months from the date of the adoption of a panel or 
the Appellate Body report [see also determination and other features of reasonable 
period, art. 21.3(a),(b)]. 
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The issue of implementation of the recommendations or rulings can be raised at the 
DSB by any member at any time following their adoption, and it can be placed on 
the agenda of the DSB meeting after six months following the date of 
establishment of the reasonable period of time. It remains on the DSB's agenda 
until it is resolved completely (art. 21.6, DSU). 
It is also noteworthy that the member concerned should report its progress in the 
implementation of the recommendations or rulings (art. 21.6, DSU). 
There is here again special treatment towards developing country members, as if 
the matter is raised by a developing country member, the DSB considers ―what 
further action it might take which would be appropriate to the circumstances‖ 
(art.21.7, DSU). ―[I]f the case is one brought by a developing country [m]ember, in 
considering what appropriate action might be taken, the DSB takes into account not 
only the trade coverage of measures complained of, but also their impact on the 
economy of developing country [m]embers concerned (art. 21.8, DSU). 
When a Party fails to implement the recommendations and rulings of the report 
within a reasonable period of time, compensation and the suspension of 
concessions or other obligations can be applied against that party (art. 22, DSU). 
So, that party should enter into negotiations with any party having invoked the 
dispute settlement procedures to determine mutually acceptable compensation 
which should be agreed within 20 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable 
period of time. With the expiry of 20 days, any party having invoked the dispute 
settlement can ask the DSB for the suspension of concessions (art. 22.2, DSU, see 
also art. 22.3 (a-g), for the principles and procedures in considering what 
concessions or other obligations to suspend). The DSB should grant the 
authorization for the suspension of concessions within 30 days of the expiry of a 
reasonable period of time, unless there is a consensus against it (art. 22.6, DSU). 
However, if the member concerned submits an objection regarding the suspension, 
the matter should be referred to arbitration (art. 25, DSU) which should be 
completed within 60 days after the date of expiry of the reasonable period of time 
(art. 22.6, DSU).  
In accordance with art. 21.6, DSU, the DSB should keep monitoring the 
implementation of adopted recommendations or rulings in those situations as well 
(art. 22.8, DSU). The Parties to a dispute can also resort to arbitration, and the 
arbitration decision given pursuant to art. 25, DSU is also subject to monitoring of 
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implementation and compensation, and suspension of concessions as foreseen in 
arts. 21 and 22, DSU (art. 25.4, DSU).  
With respect to specifically compliance issue, it should be noted that the WTO 
agreements also involve provisions aiming to facilitate compliance, such as 
notification requirements, counter-notifications,
 
transparency, committees for the 
review of the operation of the related agreement.
1
  
Regarding notifications and counter-notifications, the Report of the Working Group 
on Notification Obligations and Procedures, while underlining the importance of 
increasing the rates of compliance in all WTO agreements, also focused technical 
assistance with respect to some developing country members. It was also agreed that 
the listing of notification obligations and the compliance should be maintained on an 
―on-going basis‖ and issued ―semi-annually‖ to all members, and also notifications 
should be issued ―as unrestricted and made available on the WTO website.‖  
Regarding transparency, in the Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures (15 
April 1994),
2
 members have agreed on improving transparency, effectiveness of 
monitoring arrangements, and the operation of publication and notification 
procedures under the WTO agreements. In addition, the establishment of a central 
registry of notifications (CRN) which would inform members annually of the 
regular notification obligations was raised by that Decision. 
On committees for the review of the operation of the related agreement, some 
examples can be given here. To illustrate, the Agreement on the Application of 
Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement) has a Committee (SPS 
Committee) in which WTO members can exchange information on all aspects 
related to the implementation of the SPS Agreement. This Committee also has 
entitled to review compliance with the SPS Agreement and to discuss matters 
related to notification and transparency. In addition, Agreement on Agriculture has 
also a Committee (Committee on Agriculture) which has entitled to review 
implementation of the agreement. The Committee established under the Agreement 
on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) has also the same right, it reviews the 
implementation every three years. Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing 
Measures (SCM Agreement) has a Committee on Subsidies and Countervailing 
                                                     
1 For examples of compliance-related provisions in the WTO agreements, see (WTO, 2001, pp. 20-
23).  
2 Ministerial Decision on Notification Procedures. Retrieved from 
http://www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/33-dnotf.pdf. 
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Measures (SCM Committee) and subsidiary bodies (e.g. Permanent Group of 
Experts) which enables the members to consult and lead to information on any 
matter relating to the operation and implementation of the agreement.
 
 
The WTO Agreement also provides a mechanism, Trade Policy Review 
Mechanism (TPRM),
1
 for improving compliance with the commitments undertaken 
under the agreement. Based on the reports of members and the Secretariat, this 
mechanism reviews trade policies of members working as ―an effective and 
transparent fact-finding mechanism,‖ thus, even in an indirect way, improves 
compliance and avoids disputes. 
 
4. The Relationship between the MEAs’ DSPs and the WTO’s DSP  
An important matter relating to the WTO DSP in environment-related cases is the 
relationship between the WTO DSP and the MEAs DSPs. This is because if a 
dispute involves issues related to the dispute settlement provisions of a MEA, 
while at the same related to the WTO matters, the question which one should be 
applied arises.  
If there is no choice of treaty clause, the rules lex posterior v. lex specialis under 
the 1969 Vienna Convention can also not be applied here, since trade and 
environment regimes have different subject matters, nature and objectives. So, the 
law applied to them and the remedies offered by them are also generally different. 
Article 23 of the DSU stipulates that disputes related to the interpretation and 
application of WTO provisions can be brought only before the WTO bodies (panel, 
the Appellate Body, or arbitration under art. 25, DSU) in accordance with the rules 
and procedures of this Understanding. 
However, to the WTO Committee on Trade and Environment (CTE) (1996), if a 
dispute arises between WTO members over the use of trade measures taken under a 
MEA, if both sides are parties to that MEA, then, they should consider trying to 
settle it through the mechanisms available under the MEA. Then, in the case that 
one side in the dispute has not signed that MEA, then the WTO should be the only 
forum that should be revoked for resolving that dispute (UNEP-IISD, 2000, p. 62; 
Sampson, 2005). 
                                                     
1 Trade Policy Review Mechanism. Retrieved from  
http://www.wto.org/english/res_e/booksp_e/analytic_index_e/tprm_01_e.htm#6. 
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With regard to this recommendation of the WTO CTE, it should be underlined that, 
although it has been taken into account as a recommendation in WTO procedures, 
it does not amend the article 23, DSU. In addition to this, if there is no provision in 
the MEA concerned obliging its parties to use its DSP in the case of a dispute 
before initiating a WTO dispute, it cannot be argued that, there is an obligation to 
exhaust MEA dispute-settlement mechanisms before initiating a procedure under 
the WTO (González-Calatayud & Marceau, 2002). If both processes have been 
initiated, given ―the quasiautomatic nature of the WTO dispute process and Article 
23 of the DSU‖ (González-Calatayud & Marceau, 2002), it is not expected that the 
WTO procedure has been ceased due to the existence of a parallel dispute under 
MEAs‘ system, and the experience displays that the WTO procedure has been 
concluded in a shorter period than the procedure conducted under MEAs 
(González-Calatayud & Marceau, 2002).  
 
5. A Comparative Analysis: Weaknesses of Both Systems in the 
Settlement of Environmental Disputes  
DSPs established under MEAs, explained above briefly, involve a series of 
diplomatic and judicial means of dispute settlement. Even though these methods 
available for resolving disputes have considerably improved over time, it is still 
controversial whether they are well-equipped to deal with the environmental issues 
(Sands, 1996:50). This is particularly because, they are confrontational and 
adversarial and are designed for bilateral disputes (diplomatic means either), yet, 
environmental problems are often multilateral in nature. So, in case of violation of 
an obligation, it is hard to define two sides of the dispute. In addition, as they are 
usually ―confined to the facts of a specific dispute,‖ so, they ―cannot deal with the 
whole or part of a broader environmental problem‖ (Guruswamy & Hendricks, 
1997).  
Of these different means, in practice, it is generally observed that diplomatic means 
are further revoked than judicial means and further supported by MEAs. This is 
particularly because they are more flexible and cooperative, as mostly based on the 
consensus of the parties. Yet, they cannot be preferred to be applied by the parties, 
as they can be ―ineffective‖ because of having no compulsory nature (Charney, 
1996). 
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Judicial means can be admitted as compulsory and binding for the parties to the 
dispute (most of them do not refer to compulsory-binding mechanisms (exception: 
ITLOS and the Fish Stocks Agreement). However, they are rarely used in practice 
either and are seen as improper in the field of environmental law in general, and in 
MEAs specifically (Charney, 1996). 
Even Stephens (2009:346) arguing that the international environmental litigation 
has been flourished, accepts that he makes this evaluation ―taking an expansive 
definition, so that all those disputes involving at least one issue of environmental 
protection or management are captured.‖ This is because:  
1. states usually do not want to damage their relationships challenging another 
state taking it before a court (Brownlie, 2003:693; Faure and Lefevere, 1999); 
2. their proceedings are regarded as costly, slow and troublesome (Charney, 
1996); (Kolari, 2002); 
3. the absence of an enforcement and monitoring mechanism which can provide 
the implementation and compliance of their decisions also restricts their influence; 
4. judicial decisions do not prevent the damage before it occurs, but, use 
measures such as restoration of the previous situation or compensation after it 
occurs. Given the irreversible character of environmental damages (Enderlin, 
2003), they do not meet the needs of environmental protection. 
Because of the reasons mentioned above, in recent years, most MEAs have started 
to focus on more flexible mechanisms-compliance mechanisms- based on 
facilitative-preventive-cooperative approaches to address the issue of settling 
disputes and promoting compliance, and for the avoidance of both disputes and 
non-compliance (Savaşan, 2013). 
Table 1. Weaknesses of Both Systems 
DSPs established under MEAs 
(diplomatic and judicial means) 
DSP established under WTO 
 confrontational  
 adversarial  
 designed for bilateral disputes (yet, 
environmental problems are often multilateral 
in nature) 
 less compulsory-less binding 
 the lack of transperancy  
 NGOs participation(despite the use 
of amicus briefs)in procedures  
 the problems of implementation 
and compliance,  
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 diplomatic means are further revoked than 
judicial means and further supported by 
MEAs, but, have no compulsory nature, 
 Judicial means can be compulsory and 
binding for the parties to the dispute. However, 
they are rarely used in practice either. This is 
because: 
1. states usually do not want to damage their 
relationships with other states taking them 
before a court  
2. their proceedings are regarded as costly, 
slow and laborious 
3. there is no enforcement and monitoring 
mechanism  
4. judicial decisions do not prevent the 
damage before it occurs, so not meets the 
needs of environmental protection 
 its inadequancy on cases involving 
environmental issues. 
 
 
The WTO‘s DSP, on the other hand, through its Understanding on the Settlement 
of Disputes (DSU), is backed up by compulsory and binding system of settlement 
of disputes arising under WTO agreements. So, the overall system with its DSP 
and TPRM, is defined as a system including a mixture of police patrol (―efforts by 
centralized authorities to actively and systematically look for violations‖) 
(Raustiala, 2001) and fire alarm (―rely[ing] instead on individuals or individual 
parties who are empowered to trigger investigations through a formalized 
institution approaches to implementation and compliance review‖) (Raustiala, 
2001). In fact, through particularly its strict time limitations on the duration of 
proceedings (e.g.12.8, DSU), specific deadlines for intermediate steps in dispute 
settlement process (e.g.art.5.4, DSU, art.8.7, DSU, art.16.1, DSU, art.16.2, 
DSU..etc.), ―quasi-automatic‖ (González-Calatayud & Marceau, 2002;WTO, 2001) 
adoption of panel reports, the Appelate Body, its well-qualified and experienced 
panelists (art.8.1, DSU)and members (art.17.3, DSU), compulsory and binding 
decisions, and the possibility of imposition of bilateral trade sanctions, the 
suspension of trade concessions or the provision of compensation as measures, 
provisions aiming to facilitate compliance, such as notification requirements, 
counter-notifications, transparency, committees for the review of the operation of 
the related agreement, it is seen as the strongest DSP when compared with others. 
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However, this system has also some shortcomings like the lack of transperancy and 
NGOs participation(despite the use of amicus briefs)in procedures (despite the 
emergence of a ― trend toward greater transperancy‖),1 the problems of 
implementation and compliance, and -the most significant one for this study-, its 
inadequancy on cases involving environmental issues. 
Indeed, Article XX of GATT [art. XX, GATT, (b), (g), (chapeau)] involves 
exceptions regarding environmental concerns to trade obligations of the agreement. 
So, even before the WTO Agreement, there have been cases related to 
environmental issues, such as Tuna case (US vs.Canadia), Salmon and Herring 
case (US vs. Canadia), Cigarettes case (US vs.Thailand), Tuna case (US vs. 
Mexico), Tuna Case (US vs. EEC), Automobiles Case (US vs.EEC). After the 
WTO agreement, Gasoline case (US vs. Brazil, Venezuele), Shrimp Turtle Case 
(US vs. Malaysia, Indian, Pakistan, Thailand (joint case) and Asbestos case (EC vs. 
Canada) can be counted as examples.
2
 
Of these, particularly Schrimp-turtle case
3
 should be emphasized as the WTO DSP 
begins to take into account environmental concerns further with this case, while 
there was less tolerance to environmental issues from 1990 to 1998 (e.g.Tuna 
Dolphin Case) (Charnovitz, 2005). However, the decisons of the WTO DSP on the 
issues related to the environmental concerns is generally criticized as it does not 
sufficiently pay attention to them.  
Table 2. Strengths of the DSP established under WTO 
Through its Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU), it provides 
stronger characteristics: 
 strict time limitations on the duration of proceedings; 
 specific deadlines for intermediate steps in dispute settlement process; 
 quasi-automatic adoption of panel reports; 
 the Appelate Body, its well-qualified and experienced panelists and members; 
 compulsory and binding decisions; 
 the possibility of imposition of the suspension of trade concessions or the 
provision of compensation as measures; 
 provisions aiming to facilitate compliance, such as notification requirements, 
                                                     
1 See (Downes and Penhoet, 1999; Hunter, Salzman, Zaelke, 2002) for the details on transperancy, 
NGOs‘ participation, and the use of amicus briefs. 
2 For details on cases, see (WTO, 2004).  
3 For details see (Cameron, 2005; UNEP, 2005, pp. 27-30; WTO, 2008, pp. 62-69). 
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counter-notifications, transparency, committees for the review of the operation of the 
related agreement. 
To improve the WTO DSP in environment-related cases, there are several 
recommendations like the involvement of MEA secretariats, use of environmental 
experts, to be able to refer to the ICJ where rights and obligations outside of the 
WTO sphere are applicable (yet, requires the amendment on art. 23, DSU),
 
to 
increase the use of art. 5, DSU methods (mediation, conciliation and good offices)-
as they require the agreement of all parties to the dispute, they are rarely used-, and 
the establishment of an environment advisory board consisting of experts to which 
the parties to the dispute have to resort before formal DSPs.
1
 However, all these 
recommendations remain to be controversial. 
Table 3. Proposals for the Improvement of the WTO DSP in Environment-related 
Cases 
 the involvement of MEA secretariats, 
 the use of environmental experts, 
 to be able to refer to the ICJ where rights and obligations outside of the WTO 
sphere are,
 
 
 to increase the use of art. 5, DSU methods (mediation, conciliation and good 
offices), 
 the establishment of an environment advisory board consisting of experts to 
which the parties to the dispute have to resort before formal DSPs 
 
6. Conclusions 
Consequently, based on these findings, it can be argued that DSPs do not play a 
crucial role in ensuring compliance with MEAs which primarily aim to induce the 
parties to compliance or to enhance their compliance through various forms of 
international cooperation, such as reporting, assistance, non-compliance 
procedures, non-compliance response measures. Specifically, if the violation does 
not stem from deliberate non-compliance, but rather lack of inability or incapacity, 
to address non-compliance through DSPs become more problematic, and this 
situation better explains why MEAs prefer compliance mechanism rather than 
DSPs. In the WTO system, on the other hand, there is a compulsory dispute 
settlement mechanism referring to exclusive jurisdiction (art.23, DSU) and 
                                                     
1 For details see (González-Calatayud & Marceau, 2002). 
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producing binding decisions strict timetables, specific procedures and more 
powerful measures supported by binding decisions. When comparing the dispute 
settlement provisions of the MEAs discussed above with those of the WTO then it 
becomes clear that the WTO system operates in a more effective way than the 
MEAS‘ system in the settlement of environmental disputes and in ensuring 
compliance. 
However, it should not be forgotten that ―… the WTO is not an environmental 
protection agency and that it does not aspire to become one. Its competence in the 
field of trade and environment is limited to trade policies and to the trade-related 
aspects of environmental policies which have a significant effect on trade‖. (WTO, 
2004, p. 6) 
That is, MEAs should develop more influential and operative mechanisms, such as 
CMs-even they have also some weaknesses to ensure compliance-(Savaşan, 2013), 
or should develop the existing ones on the basis of the problems of the present 
system and the new needs. While doing that, it can benefit from the information, 
expertise and practice taken pursuant to WTO DSP, so as to improve the 
compliance with their provisions - the WTO system can also benefit from those of 
the MEAs-. Nevertheless, this requires a well operating coordination mechanism -
or coordination units- between two systems. Unfortunately ‗coordination‘ rises as 
one of the most important problems in the new century, particularly in 
environmental system which has been built under regimes addressing the specific 
issue areas individually, so operating relatively isolated from each other (Savaşan, 
2013). 
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